Conviction Voting
2 min read
Pronunciation
[kuhn-vik-shuhn voh-ting]
Analogy
Imagine a 'suggestion box' in a community where people can put in ideas (proposals) and then place 'support tokens' on the ideas they like. The longer a token stays on an idea, the heavier it becomes (conviction grows). When an idea has enough 'heavy tokens' (accumulated conviction) to tip a scale (pass a threshold), it gets approved. People can move their tokens if they change their mind, so conviction for an idea can also decrease.
Definition
Conviction Voting is a decentralized governance mechanism used primarily in DAOs where participants stake tokens on proposals they support. The "conviction" or voting power of their stake on a particular proposal increases over time. A proposal passes once its accumulated conviction score surpasses a dynamically calculated threshold.
Key Points Intro
Conviction Voting allows for continuous, fluid participation in DAO governance, where prolonged support for proposals gradually increases their likelihood of passing.
Key Points
Time-Weighted Voting Power: The influence of a staked token grows the longer it remains staked on a proposal.
Continuous Participation: Voters can stake or change their stake at any time, unlike discrete voting periods.
Dynamic Thresholds: Proposals require a certain level of sustained support to pass, not just a majority at a single point in time.
Reduces Whales' Instant Dominance: Makes it harder for large token holders to instantly pass proposals without sustained community agreement.
Example
In a DAO using Conviction Voting for fund allocation, members stake their governance tokens on various funding proposals. Proposal A might quickly attract many tokens but if that support is fleeting, its conviction might not reach the threshold. Proposal B, however, might attract fewer tokens initially, but if those supporters maintain their stake for a long period, its conviction will gradually build until it surpasses the threshold and the funds are released.
Technical Deep Dive
Conviction $C$ for a proposal is often calculated by summing the conviction of each voter $i$ staking an amount $a_i$ for a time $t_i$. The conviction for one voter might be $C_i(t) = a_i \times f(t)$, where $f(t)$ is a function that increases with time (e.g., using a half-life decay model for how fast conviction builds or decays when tokens are moved). A proposal passes if its total conviction $C_{total}$ meets or exceeds a trigger threshold $\alpha$, which might itself be dynamic based on factors like the amount of funds requested by the proposal or the total tokens staked in the system. This system favors persistent minorities over apathetic majorities.
Security Warning
While Conviction Voting aims to be more nuanced, it can still be gamed (e.g., 'last-minute conviction bombs' if not designed carefully, or complex interactions between multiple proposals). The parameters (e.g., conviction growth rate, thresholds) need careful tuning to ensure fair and effective governance.
Caveat
Conviction Voting can be more complex for users to understand than simple majority voting. It might lead to slower decision-making for proposals that require sustained high conviction. The optimal parameter settings can be difficult to determine and may need adjustments over time.
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